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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the determinants of wage pressure in large 
companies, including ownership characteristics and the impact of regional 
labour markets. By using a panel of 329 Polish largest firms during the period 
1997- 2001, we find evidence of rent sharing activities, however there is also 
asymmetry in quasi rent elasticity of wages. The wage setting mechanism 
seems to differ between new private companies, privatised companies, state 
firms and mixed ownership. In particular, wages in state firms are highly 
responsive to regional labour market conditions, while firms in other sectors 
are not. Rent sharing is visible in both the state sector and new private 
companies, yet several specific characteristics differ. On the other hand, quasi 
rent elasticity appears to be suppressed in privatised companies. 
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  1 
1. WAGES, INSIDERS AND OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISES 
 
Transition economies provide a useful ground for testing hypotheses related to 
ownership of industrial enterprises. As argued by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and again  
more recently - by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), long established markets for 
corporate control produce equilibria, where sector-specific efficient types of 
companies survive and inefficient ones disappear. In contrast, transition economies 
offer a plethora of ownership and organisational forms, created after the removal of 
command economy system. In this paper, we wish to investigate the implications of 
corporate control for wage setting patterns. 
 
When the command economy
1 system collapsed, both institutional reforms and 
stabilisation policies resulted in the initial ‘transitional recession’: plummeting labour 
demand, rising unemployment and a temporary decrease in real wages (see Huber et 
al. 2002, Mickiewicz and Bell 2000, Boeri et al. 1998). As Huber et al. (2002) state, 
the initial drop in employment levels and surge in unemployment was expected at the 
onset of the transition process. This was part of the ‘transformational recession’ 
(Kornai, 1995; Blanchard 1997). However, even when the output growth had 
recovered, employment levels did not. Employment levels in 1996 were between 5.6 
(Romania) and 22-23 (Bulgaria, Hungary) percentage points below pre transition 
levels (Mickiewicz and Bell 2000; Boeri et al. 1998). Unemployment levels also 
appear to be heterogeneous among transition economies. Huber et al.. (2002) report 
that while the average unemployment rates in some of these countries are in the 
lowest EU range (Hungary, Slovenia), some others exceed significantly the maximum 
rate observed in the EU (notably Bulgaria and Poland).  
Poland, the second largest transition economy, is an interesting case, as the 
macroeconomic trade-off between wage pressure and unemployment seems to be 
particularly unfavourable. Between 1998-2001, it underwent an  increase in 
unemployment rate from below 10% to 16%, in order to reduce real wage growth 
from an unsustainable 8% in real terms to 4%.  
                                                           
1 See Jackman and Rutkowski (1994) or Boeri at al. (1998) for a description of labour markets under 
the command economy. 2 
The motivation of this paper is to look at some microeconomic foundations of this 
phenomenon. In fact, research on the impact of privatisation on labour market 
outcomes and firm level wage pressure in transition economies is limited.
2 
Our aim is to research the determinants of wage growth at the firm level during the 
period of 1997-2001 in Poland. In particular, we look at the effects of the privatisation 
process on wage setting. We wish to explore if the wage determination mechanism is 
different for state owned, privatised and ‘de novo’ private companies. 
 
A key research question relates to the link between quasi rents and wage increases. 
The bargaining and rent sharing model imply the link between the company’s ability 
to pay  wages, provided that the bargaining position of employees is sufficiently 
strong. However, also, the temporary frictions may result in an upward sloping supply 
curve of labour (Hildreth and Oswald 1997). Therefore, ‘a positive demand shock 
may trace out a simultaneous rise in total firm profits and in wages’ (Ibid. p. 321). 
Only in the long run, is the increase  eradicated by an increase in workers entering the 
labour market, which then eliminates the wage premium. Thus, in the short run, the 
correlation between wage and financial performance may be explained by both the 
competitive model and bargaining / rent sharing model. Only estimation of the long 
run provides an empirical test to distinguish between the two models, as according to 
the competitive model the correlation is expected to disappear.  
Given this argument, the link between ability to pay and wage increases amongst 
different ownership categories becomes an important testing ground, where estimation 
of the long run effects is difficult. Moreover, different ownership categories may be 
characterised by different bargaining structures, while operating on the same markets. 
This argument can naturally be tested in the environment of transition economies.
3 
Several results are available. First, Dong (1998) and Lee (1999) examine China. Dong 
(1998) finds direct evidence that in the township -village enterprises, wage changes 
are responsive to financial conditions. Similarly, Lee (1999) finds that profit per 
                                                           
2 For an overview of earlier results see Svejnar 1999. 
3 Haskel and Szymanski (1993) test the impact of privatisation on wage setting in the UK. However, 
their results are not directly applicable to the transition economies for two reasons: /1/ legal and actual 
control rights in the UK companies before privatisation were very different from pre-privatisation 
state-owned enterprises in transition economies; /2/ their model is focused on utilities and network 
industries, where privatisation is parallel to change in regulatory regime; in contrast most of 
privatisations in transition countries were in core manufacturing branches. 3 
worker and change in profit per worker is positively associated with changes in wages 
for several types of employee. 
Other researchers have also examined the impact of productivity on wage 
determination in European transition economies, taking into account differences in 
wage setting across ownership and organisational characteristics.
4  
An interesting feature of this research is that while differences between ownership 
sectors had been hardly detectable at the beginning of transition period, they became 
more evident later. As both the privatisation process and secondary transfers of 
ownership continue, the economic system evolves towards more stable structures, and 
this includes a bargaining and wage setting framework. 
In particular, Basu et al. (2000) find that ownership and legal status of firms do not 
have a systematic effect on employment and wages for the early transition period, i.e. 
1988-1992 in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. In contrast, Grosfeld and Nivet 
(1999) - using a sample of large Polish manufacturing firms (taken from the same 
dataset we use, but in an earlier period) - find that a change in revenue per employee 
leads to changes in wages over the period of 1990-94; moreover there are significant 
differences between ownership sectors. Also Christev and Fitzroy (2002) employ a 
survey based panel of large Polish firms, in order to study wage and employment 
adjustment comparing a range of ownership and organisational forms. Their dataset 
covers 1994-1997, an even later period than Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), which may 
better capture some of the changes due to privatisation. Both studies confirm rent 
sharing behaviour in firms, where the position of insiders is strong. 
 
Our approach stems from this tradition. Yet, while we agree that the position of 
insiders may be crucial for wage determination outcomes, we also believe that there is 
still an interesting gap in empirical literature in tackling this issue. Namely, we argue 
that an interesting distinction - which to our best knowledge has been so far 
overlooked in literature on wage setting in a transition environment – relates to the 
contrast between new private firms on one hand and both state and privatised firms on 
the other.  
                                                           
4 Here, we focus primarily on research based on enterprise level data. Slightly different questions are 
typically asked by researchers, who focus either on individual data or on regional level data. For results 
and discussion, see in particular Brainerd (2002), Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000), Adamchik and 
Bedi (2000), Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000), Boeri at al., 1998; Pohl et al., 1997. 4 
The corresponding question relates to the magnitude of the structural break in 
companies’ behaviour induced by privatisation. A possible argument is that a mere 
change in ownership does not result automatically in a change  in the way the 
company operates, due to organisational inertia. Correspondingly, new companies 
may start with a more efficient mode of operation, without a prolonged process of 
adjustment. In general, it is not ownership per se, but organisational features of the 
company, which may affect performance. According to this line of argument, the 
privatisation process may change little, in particular the position of insiders may be 
left unchanged.
5 From this perspective, transition economies offer unique 
opportunities for comparisons. During the post-communist transition, an important 
role has been played by new market entries, that is companies, which were neither 
privatised nor state owned but so called ‘de novo’ firms, i.e. new companies launched 
after the transition process had started. This sector, sometimes branded as 
‘entrepreneurial’, accounts for a high proportion of output, including a significant 
number of large companies (for early size estimates of this sector for transition 
economies, see Johnson et al. 1997). The quick emergence of the ‘entrepreneurial 
sector’ may be less of a paradox than it looks at  first sight. First, some of those 
companies are green-field investment by foreign investors. Second, both domestic and 
foreign entrepreneurs could take advantage of the initial gaps in the structure of 
production, which correspond to high consumer demand, high growth opportunities, 
and high opportunities to sustain development from retained earnings. And last but 
not least, in Poland, the growth of those companies could be strongly enhanced by the 
transfer of assets from the state sector, taking advantage from both privatisation 
opportunities and direct asset sales by the state sector firms (see Balcerowicz, 1995). 
The process illustrates the point made earlier: the factors which account for the 
performance outcomes, may relate neither to characteristics of both assets nor labour, 
as those were poached from the state firms. An important point however is that the 
new entrepreneurs may be able to impose new organisational forms easily, which 
could possibly contrast with the inertia of privatised companies
6. 
                                                           
5 One possible theoretical perspective that can be applied to account for that relates to new institutional 
economics. See Furubotn 2001. 
6 For example Jones (1998) finds that insider ownership is linked to organisation inertia in the Russian 
case. 5 
From recent studies on other aspects of performance in transition countries (Carlin et 
al. 1999; Carlin et al. 2001; and overview in Havrylyshyn and McGettingan, 1999), 
we know that the distinction between old firms and new firms appears to be 
significant. 
Focusing on that distinction, our study used four ownership categories (i.e. state 
companies, state companies with minority private ownership, privatised companies 
and companies established as private - de novo). Relatively large ownership groups 
enable us to check for corresponding interactive effects with more confidence, in 
order to see if the wage pressure response to ability to pay differs.  
Revenue per employee is used as a proxy for ability to pay by other researchers, 
including Nickell and Wadhwani (1990), Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), Basu et al. 
(2000), Christev and Fitzroy (2002),. It is typically interpreted as a corresponding 
measure to labour productivity. Yet, this interpretation is questionable for two 
reasons. First, the level of sales per employee depends heavily on capital intensity of 
production. Second, by construction, changes in sales-labour ratio reflect both 
increase in sales and changes in employment. Thus, the indicator is difficult to 
interpret in terms of productivity. However, instead of rejecting this approach, we 
propose to add a qualification. Namely, we accept the line of reasoning presented by 
Van Reenen (1996), who argues that the difference between revenue per head and 
industrial wages is a good indicator of quasi rent. Thus if revenue per head is used, it 
is important either to include industrial wage in the chosen specification orto impose a 
linear restriction and focus directly on the difference between the two indicators. 
Alternatively, some studies use profits per employee as a proxy for quasi rent 
(Fakhfakh and Fitzroy 2002, Hildreth and Oswald 1997). Yet, there are two problems. 
First, this measure excludes depreciation, which should be included in available cash 
flow. Second, by construction profits are negatively correlated with wages.
7 The 
problem could be alleviated by use of instruments, but the approach brings in 
different estimation problems – as always, good instruments are difficult to find.
8 
The key results of our research show that wage determination in Poland differs far 
more for the new-old cross-section, than for state-private cross-section. In addition, 
                                                           
7 See Van Reenen (1996). Due to restricted data availability, researchers on transition economies, used 
some other proxies for the firm’ performance. See Djankov and Murell, 2002 for overview. 6 
the link with employment is important and the outside factors such as the sectoral 
wages, regional unemployment and employment rate are important in wage 
determination. We will now turn to discuss the latter issue. 
 
 
2. LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS AND WAGE PRESSURE 
 
Last but not least, outside labour market conditions play an important role in wage 
determination. The factors, which appear often in the estimation of wage equations, 
are regional unemployment and outside wages. The negative relationship between 
regional unemployment rates and wages corresponds to the wage curve. In addition, 
one should expect that the impact of short term unemployment is stronger (Nickell 
and Wadhwani 1990). This is due to the fact that the long - term unemployed are 
supposed to be inefficient in their job search and therefore they do not have an impact 
on wage determination. A counter argument might be that the large percentage of 
long-term unemployed represents a depressed labour market, which could have a 
cooling effect on wages. 
The empirical results confirming microeconomic wage curve are common in studies 
of European transition economies, as in Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), Duffy and Walsh 
(2001), Christev and FitxRoy (2002) – which all focus on  Poland, Christofides and 
Oswald (1992) for developed economies such as the UK, and Dong (1998) for China. 
They build on earlier studies related to OECD countries. In particular, Blanchflower 
(1990) found that four alternative measures of unemployment are negatively and 
significantly related to annual earnings. Holmund and Zetterberg (1991) also 
hypothesise that unemployment (they use an economy wide unemployment rate) is 
likely to depress wages,
9 in their study of the determinants of industry wages in five 
countries. Their results show that the effects of aggregate unemployment vary across 
countries: negative as expected for Sweden, Finland and Germany, yet positive for 
Norway and the USA. The result is interesting as it possibly reflects differences in 
institutional labour market characteristics implying that wage curve may be labour 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 One possibility is to use sectoral level data on profits and demand shocks. This is the approach taken 
by Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Christofides and Oswald (1992). Given we wish to control for 
sectoral wages, this path proved to be difficult to follow, due to multicollinearity problems. 7 
market institution specific. In particular, the positive coefficient for the USA may 
imply a more competitive labour market which can be interpreted along the lines of 
the ‘first generation’ models (see below). Earlier identified cross-country differences 
and evolving institutional frameworks in transition countries, make testing wage 
curves for transitional economies a non-trivial task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 However, they note that the depressing effect of higher unemployment is likely to be bigger in an 
aggregate wage equation. 8 
Author Coefficient  for:  Timespan and methods 
  Unemploy
ment 
Performan
ce 
 
Christev and Fitzroy (2002) 
Poland 
-0.06
10 0.54
11 1994-1997 
GMM 
Duffy and Walsh (2001) 
Poland 
-0.15 NA 1991-1996 
2SLS 
Blanchflower (2001) 
Eastern Europe 
Poland= -
0.13 
Rus= -
0.07 
Slovenia= 
-0.05 
Hungary= 
-0.05 
NA 1990-1997 
Fixed effects 
Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) 
Poland 
-0.03 0.14 1991-1997 
Fixed effects 
Montuengaat al. (2003) 
Europe 
France= -
0.16 
Italy =-
0.08 
Portugal= 
-0.01 
Spain= -
0.24 
UK= -0.2 
NA 1994-1996 
GLS 
Goux and Marin (1999) 
France 
NA 0.05 1990-1995 
Fixed effects 
Hildreth and Oswald (1997) UK NA 1.13 1980-86 
GMM 
Christofides and Oswald (1992) 
Canada 
-0.08 0.003 1978-1984 
GLS 
Gregg and Machin (1992) UK NA 0.12 1983-84 
GMM 
Holmund and Zetterberg (1991) 
US 
0.02 0.09 1965-85 
Autoregressive model 
Blanchlower (1990) -0.1 NA 1983-6,  89 
Pooled techniques 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1989) 
UK 
-0.01 NA 1975-1982 
GMM 
 
One should note however that the link between wages and unemployment can be 
interpreted not only in terms of bargaining theory but also in terms of efficiency wage 
theory, where wages do not result from bargaining process but from optimising 
decisions by the firms (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). 
                                                           
10 Christev and Fitzroy (2002), Christofides and Oswald (1992), Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), 
Montuenga (2003), Duffy and Walsh (2001) and Blanchflower (2001) use regional rates, Nickell and 
Wadwhani (1989) use imdustry rates and Holmund and Zetterberg use aggregate rate. 
11 Christev and Fitzroy (2002) and Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) both use growth in productivity, Hildreth 
and Oswald (1997) and Christofides and Oswald (1992)  use profit per employee, Gregg and Machin 
(1992) uses sales per employee, Holmund and Zetterberg (1991) uses value added and Goux and 
Maurin (1989) uses operating income per empolyee. 9 
In addition, there is a dissenting tradition of the neo-classical or “first generation” of 
papers by researchers such as Harris- Todaro (1970), Hall (1970) and Rosen (1986) 
predicting that unemployment and wages would move in the same direction. This 
relies on the perfectly competitive theory and compensating differentials. Cahuc et al. 
(2002) summarise this idea: “the higher the risk of losing one’s job, the higher the 
wage to compensate for this risk,” (p15). Also wages may have to compensate for job 
characteristics, location, flexibility, risk to health etc.  
Rosen (1986) provides some evidence of the theory of equalising differences, which 
“refers to the observed wage differentials required to equalise total monetary and 
non monetary advantages or disadvantages among worker activities and among 
workers themselves”. The actual wage paid is the sum of labour services and worker 
characteristics, plus job attributes. Thus jobs offering unfavourable conditions pay 
wage premiums as offsetting compensation to attract workers. Unfavourable 
conditions include risk to health
12, inflexible hours or the possible risk of lay off and 
unemployment, the latter being relevant to the private sector companies. 
Duffy and Walsh (2001) provide a brief survey of the “first generation of papers” 
written in the 1970’s and 1980’s, which all found a positive relationship between 
wages and unemployment. However, they criticise this line of research for failing to 
control for regional fixed effects. They argue that after including regional dummies, 
the relationship between regional pay and unemployment are in fact negatively 
correlated (Ibid., p.25). 
Nevertheless, the evidence is still not conclusive. A recent study by Cahuc et al. 
(2002) on a panel of French firms finds some new evidence that confirms the 
predictions of equalising differences, as unions accept lower aggregate wages when 
workers benefit from lower unemployment risk. Thus the higher the risk of loosing a 
job, the higher the wage needs to be to compensate for risk, i.e. the wage bargaining 
mechanism leads to equalising differences between firms (Ibid., p15). As argued 
above, the parameters of the wage curve are conditional on labour market institutions 
(competitiveness in particular), and therefore neither cross country nor time invariant, 
and still worth further testing.  
                                                           
12 One example Rosen (1986) gives is that in the Soviet era large wage premia were paid to workers in 
the permafrost regions of Siberia. 10 
A recent concise theoretical model underpinning the wage curve is offered by Sato 
(2000). His benchmark case is relevant to transition economies, as it describes the 
case where workers are not mobile
13.  The explanation for the wage curve is given by 
a search model with regional variations in productivity. By adopting wage bargaining 
assumptions the region with higher productivity experiences higher wages and lower 
unemployment. Even, if workers are mobile, the traditional wage curve may hold if 
the search model is combined with regional variations in productivity and a city 
structure with congestion costs. While all the workers will want to live and work in 
the central business district, the living area of workers spreads and commuting and 
rental costs escalate. These costs will deter concentration in one region even if there 
are differences in productivity among regions. 
Where we intend to contribute to this discussion, is to point out that unemployment 
elasticity of wages is ownership specific. As a result, in the environment where 
different types of firms respond differently to labour market conditions, the 
parameters of the wage curve may evolve along the ownership transformation. 
 
Hypotheses 
Here, we summarise our main hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section.  
First, we expect that the link between quasi rents and wages to be ownership/ 
organisational sector specific. In particular, as discussed above, we wish to check if 
the contrast between new and old companies dominates the comparison between the 
state and privatised sector. 
Second, due to labour market characteristics of the transition counties and Poland in 
particular, we expect to find confirmation for the microeconomic wage curve. 
However, we intend to explore if the results are invariant along the ownership cross 
section. 
Third, we wish to test for asymmetry
14 effects in quasi rent elasticity of wages, to see 
if the pattern evolves over time, comparing with earlier results, Grosfeld and Nivet 
(1999) in particular.  
                                                           
13 Low spacial mobility in transition countries is discussed in Huber et al. (2002). 
14 The asymmetry hypothesis was suggested by Lindbeck and Snower (1987). They propose that the 
downward responsiveness of wages to a demand shock is less than that of the wage response to a 
positive demand shock. 11 
Last but not least, in the empirical section, we propose a new simple indicator of quasi 
rents and compare the results with other models, where tests relate to revenues per 
head. 
 
3.  Methodology and data description 
 
3.1 Data 
Hamermesh (1993) discusses problems associated with collecting data for studies of 
labour demand. He notes that household level data can be inappropriate for studying 
labour market issues; instead data describing plants or firms is superior (p.63). The 
conclusions apply to the research on wage determinants, in particular where the focus 
is on firm-specific issues such as rent sharing. Following this, we follow the stream of 
empirical literature on transition economies, which rely on publicly available 
company level data on largest companies. Our data corresponds closely to that used 
by Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) for an earlier period. Also datasets used by Basu et al. 
(2000) and Christev and Fitzroy (2002) are similar, while the latter paper uses data 
from a survey, yet sampled from a similar population of Polish firms. 
The source of our data is from a different project (with participation of one of the co-
authors), financed by the Polish Committee for Scientific Research (grant 1H02C-
024-19), which was shared with us for the purpose of this study. The results of the 
earlier project (which focused on the group of privatised companies) are at present 
available in Polish, in an edited volume (Baltowski 2002). 
The dataset was compiled by the Polish project team using all publicly available 
sources on Polish largest companies and the database of the Institute of Economics of 
the Polish Academy of Science, which is the basis of several published lists of largest 
companies’ results. Where possible this was supplemented and checked using direct 
information publicly disclosed by the companies, and also available information by 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange and several lists published by journals and magazines, 
including Rzeczpospolita, Polityka, Gazeta Bankowa, Nowe Zycie Gospodarcze, Zycie 
Gospodarcze, Businessman. 
  Apart from standard type errors, several systemic problems were encountered 
by the Polish team during data processing. First, while in principle state companies 
were prevented from buying shares of other privatised companies in Poland, that 12 
neither applied to all privatisations (or semi-privatisations) resulting from bank-led 
restructuring programmes, nor to post privatisation ownership transfers, including for 
instance companies privatised via National Investment Funds programme. As a result, 
a number of ‘privatised’ companies are wrongly attributed to the private sector 
instead of state sector. Some of those links are not easy to detect, because of multi 
layered cross-company ownership. The dataset has been corrected for this type of 
error, where possible. Related problems relate to the distinction between minority and 
dominant class of owners. Also, sometimes companies are wrongly classified as ‘de 
novo’ private companies, either because they have been formally registered as a new 
company, as part of the privatisation proceedings, or because they are new companies 
created by other state-controlled firms.
15 This relates in particular to companies 
privatised by employee buy-outs, i. e. by leasing (for details, see Mickiewicz and 
Baltowski, 2002). And last but not least, when compiling data for several years, one 
has to pay attention to the fact that some sources do not distinguish between 
individual companies and consolidated balances of capital groups with similar names. 
This has been checked for relevant companies, as compiling both categories into one 
time series would create a serious distortion in data. 
As the data contain information about both the name of the company and 
location, we were able to match the data set with corresponding administrative units 
and subsequently with relevant regional labour market indicators available from the 
Polish Central Statistical Office. A particular problem we encountered was related to 
the fact that 82 out of 329 companies included in the sample are registered in Warsaw 
(25%) and they in fact are split into two sub-categories: companies operating nation-
wide, and those where most of their operations are located in the capital city. 
Therefore, using information on individual companies, we identified 29 companies, 
for which most of operations (typically manufacturing production, but also hotels etc) 
are located in Warsaw. The remaining firms (53, equivalent to 16% of the sample) we 
label nation-wide. Those typically include both trade companies, retail networks in 
particular, but also manufacturing, where the majority of operations is spread across 
several locations. The chosen method to deal with this data problem was to attribute 
                                                           
15 In our dataset that relates to three companies: Centertel, Lim and Polcomtel, which we classified as 
‘state – mixed’. 13 
national averages as relevant labour market indicators in the case of those companies 
labelled nation-wide. 
 
3.2 Descriptive  statistics 
Here descriptive statistics are presented for selected variables in the data set. 
The table below presents median values for the three ownership categories. Reported 
significance levels relate to non-parametric tests on the equality of medians. 
Table 2. Median values for selected variables over 1999-2001
a 
Variable  All firms  Private  
de novo 
Privatised  State Mixed  State 100% 
Treasury 
% change in 
real wage 
8.56 6.15 10.30 9.26  6.26 
% change in 
real total 
revenue 
0.60 4.22***  -0.21 2.23  -1.66***   
% change in 
revenue / 
employment 
4.60 2.26 8.07**  6.78  2.54*** 
earnings before 
taxes / revenue 
1.85 2.46**  2.15  1.50  1.39* 
net income / 
revenue 
1.12 1.70**  1.21  1.00  0.78** 
 
*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; **** Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1 
a Significance levels relate to Pearson χ
2 (continuity corrected) based on the non-parametric 
test on the equality of medians 
 
Several conclusions follow immediately from Table 2. Wage growth is weakest both 
in the in the private de novo firms and in the (‘non-reformed’) state sector, albeit the 
reasons for that may be very different. Indeed, the results on wages contrast clearly 
with profitability: both gross and net measures of profitability are highest for the new 
private firms and lowest for the state sector, with both being consistently significant. 
This puts wage dynamics in perspective, as the crucial point is comparison between 
wage increase and financial results as that indicates the extent of rent sharing. From 
this perspective, the state sector looks very different from the new private firms. 
While in the latter group moderate wage growth is matched by financial performance, 
in the former, similar wages increases are parallel to median net income rate being 
close to zero. 14 
Another noteworthy point is that differences in profitability are strongly related to 
differences in dynamics of revenue: in the period we consider, the state sector was 
also characterised by the lowest revenue dynamics. In this case, contrast between 
those two ownership groups is even more significant. 
Also, interesting differences relate to revenue per employee. While, de novo sector is 
characterised by highest dynamics of revenues, it is not so in relation to revenue per 
employee. Here, dynamics are higher in the privatised sector. This clearly results from 
different employment dynamics (i.e. the denominator). The de novo sector is simply 
more efficient in employment creation and preservation than both the state and the 
privatised sector. This exemplifies why revenue per head is not a good indicator of 
performance, in spite the fact that it is widely used as such in empirical research on 
transition economies. On the other hand, the difference between the revenue per head 
and sectoral wage may still be valid as a measure of available quasi rent, as argued by 
Van Reenen (1996). 
In this category, the ‘unreformed’ state sector is still the worst performer, while 
privatised firms score best, but mostly due to labour shedding, as comparison with 
dynamics of total revenue easily reveals. 
 
3.3 Variable description 
This section presents the variables used in the model. Description is presented in 
Table 3 below. 
 15 
Table 3. Description of available variables 
Description of variable  Details / comments 
Dependent variable 
l_rwage 
Logarithm of real wages 
Logarithm of (average monthly wage in zlotys/consumer 
price index).Data available for 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001. CPI
16: Central Statistical Office indicator 
Internal characteristics 
l_employ: Logarithm of 
number of employees 
Available for 1996-2001 
 
l_rtremp: Logarithm of (real 
revenue / employment) 
Logarithm of [(total revenue in million zlotys/ consumer 
price index) / employment ] 
Available for 1996-2001  
ebt_rev: Earnings before 
taxes/ revenue 
Available for 1996-2001  
 
ntin_rev: Net income/ 
revenue 
Available for 1996-2001  
 
state_trea100: State firm  
(dummy variable) 
State ownership: entirely owned by the State Treasury 
state_mix: State firm with 
mixed ownership  
(dummy variable) 
Majority state ownership with other owners present: a 
firm with the majority of shares owned by the treasury, 
or a company, where majority of shares is held by a state 
firm; the category includes also few firms controlled by 
local governments 
privatis: Priviatised firm 
(dummy variable) 
A previously state-owned company, which was no longer 
state-owned by 2001 
de_novo: De novo private 
firm (dummy variable) 
A new private company, i.e. which is neither state owned 
nor was ever state owned 
External characteristics (Central Statistical Office data) 
l_rswage: Logarithm of real 
sectoral wages 
Logarithm of (average monthly wage in zlotys/consumer 
price index). Data available for 1996-2001, two digit 
NACE industrial sectors 
l_unsu_n: Log of 
unemployment rate, 
province level 
From labour force surveys (ILO definition) 
Unemployment rate at the provincial level; 17 (new) 
provinces. Mid year. Available for: 1995-2000 
l_unre_s: Log of registered 
unemployment rate, sub-
regional level 
Sub-regions: 43 units, including large cities, as defined 
by the Central Statistical Office of Poland. End of year. 
Available for: 1998-2000 
LTE: Proportion of long 
term unemployment in total 
employment, sub-regional 
Short term: less than one year. End of year 
Available for: 1998-2000 
l_emp_n: Log of 
employment rate, province 
Mid year. Available for: 1995-2000; ; 17 (new) 
provinces 
 
 
                                                           
16 Other studies have also used CPI as a deflator, such as Christofides and Oswald (1992) and Abowd 
and Lemieux(1993). 16 
3. 4 Econometrics:details 
While we employ other techniques to provide comparability with some earlier results, 
the focus of estimation is on Generalised Method of Moments. In particular, Judson 
and Owen (1999) supports the conclusion that the estimation method originated by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) is superior as compared with feasible alternatives for 
panels with a short time dimension. The GMM estimator is robust in that it does not 
require information of the exact distribution of the disturbances and is instrumental in 
combating the problems associated with potential endogenity. However, the panel we 
have at our disposal is particularly short– and furthermore it shrinks to three time 
points as soon as we apply first differences. While Christev and FitzRoy (2002) were 
able to estimate Arellano-Bond model on the data of similar dimension, it turned out 
to be problematic in our case. We adopt an approach, where we apply several 
available techniques including the dynamic specification, and report the results, using 
specification tests to indicate which models may be the most efficient. 
  We made several informed choices in the specification choice of the model.  
Firstly, following recommended methodology, we focused on first differences to 
alleviate possible problems related to individual fixed effects. Secondly, while we 
follow a standard practice of using revenues per employee, while controlling for 
sectoral wages, when testing for rent sharing, we also combine a simple indicator of 
quasi rents (see below). Also, we adopted a restrained approach in our choice of 
ownership categories. Given that the relatively small samples of enterprises are 
available for transition economies, when too many distinctions are introduced, the 
corresponding groups are becoming small and one can notice volatility of results 
between various empirical studies. Therefore we choose the four ownership 
categories, described in Tables 1 and 2: state companies, state companies with 
minority private ownership, privatised companies and de novo firms.  
Another critical element of wage setting relates to the response of wages to regional 
labour market conditions. As argued above, we extend the analysis here, as compared 
with earlier studies, both by correcting for companies, which operate nation-wide 
while being registered in the capital city (see above). We also used several alternative 17 
labour market indicators, which include survey unemployment, registered 
unemployment and employment (not reported).
17 
 
4.  Results and discussion 
 
We start with the econometric design copied from Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), as their 
results are based on the same set of companies. The direct comparison is presented in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 below. They show random effects estimations, which 
Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) choose as their preferred estimation method, as justified by 
Hausman test against fixed effects (within) model. Interestingly, the signs of the 
coefficients are the same and the size of the coefficients is in a similar range, apart 
from the impact of regional unemployment, where our results indicate a stronger 
effect on wage dynamics. 
                                                           
17 In addition we tested for the hypothesis formulated by Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) distinguishing 
between long term and short term unemployment. We were unable to confirm it. 18 
 
Table 4. Wage equations; comparison with Grosfeld and Nivet (1999). Dependent 
variable: ∆l_rwage  
 (1) 
1991-
1994 
Random 
Effects 
GLS
a 
(2) 
1998-2001 
Random 
Effects 
GLS
 
(3) 
1998- 
2001 
Fixed 
Effects 
(within) 
(4) 
1998-2001 
Pooled 
OLS
b 
(5) 
Arellano-Bond 
GMM 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
(one stage) 
(6) 
Arellano-
Bond 
GMM 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
(two stage) 
Constant 0.097* 
(0.039) 
0.047 
(0.035) 
0.020 
0.040 
0.055* 
(0.022) 
-0.047 
(0.076) 
-0.058 
(0.077) 
∆l_rtremp  0.140** 
(0.020) 
0.188*** 
(0.041) 
0.232*** 
(0.054) 
0.175*** 
(0.043) 
0.170** 
(0.070) 
0.243* 
(0.105) 
∆ 
l_rswage 
0.894** 
(0.052) 
0.766*** 
(0.195) 
0.948*** 
(0.231) 
0.705*** 
(0.153) 
-0.332 
(0.710) 
-0.349 
(0.862) 
∆ 
l_unsu_nt-
1 
c 
-0.031* 
(0.014) 
-0.227† 
(0.123) 
-0.170 
(0.147) 
-0.255† 
(0.146) 
-0.120 
(0.226) 
-0.156 
(0.217) 
Wald χ
2  -  109.62***       
F      32.53*** 72.27***    
Sargan 
test: χ
2 
(over-
identifying 
restrictions) 
      79.90***  28.14*** 
R
2  0.373  0.143  0.145 0.143    
N
  678  587  587 587 311  311 
*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; **** Significant at 0.05; † Significant 
at 0.1 
a Grosfeld and Nivet (1999)
b Robust standard errors; corrected for possible 
interdependence of observations within the same provinces (clusters).
  
b Survey unemployment rates are mid year values , therefore one year lag is used
 . 
c Survey unemployment rates are mid year values, therefore one year lag is used 
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In columns (3)-(6) we present the results of alternative specification methods, that is 
fixed effects, pooled ordinary least squares and Arellano-Bond GMM. The most 
consistent result relates to the impact of revenue per employee, which is consistently 
highly significant, with the size of the effects varying from 0.170 to 0.243, depending 
on the estimation method. The result can be interpreted as evidence of rent sharing 
behaviour, with the effect being marginally stronger than for the early transition 
period (0.140 in Grosfeld and Nivet 1999). The effect of regional unemployment is 
consistently negative, but less significant. In specification (4) where we correct 
standard errors for possible interdependence of observation within regions, the 
significance level is cut from below the 5% threshold (not reported) to below the 10% 
threshold. Finally, sectoral wages appear to correlate significantly with enterprise 
level wages, apart from the dynamic specifications. 
Comparing the estimation methods, one can see that random effects, fixed effects and 
pooled OLS result in relatively similar estimations. The dynamic specifications seem 
to differ more, nevertheless in both one stage and two stage specifications, and  the 
Sargan test strongly rejects validity of the models. The value of χ
2 is greatly reduced 
when the two stage procedure is used, yet not enough; the test still strongly rejects the 
validity of the second model. Also, estimations of the autoregressive term are not 
robust (which we did not report). The problem with Arellano-Bond specifications may 
results from the fact that we loose considerable number of observations. The reported 
number of observations is not only reduced by the fact that we lost one time point for 
the lagged dependent variable, but also because of the missing data problems in 
earlier time points used for instruments. One possible path would be to use maximum 
likelihood methods to impute missing values, for instance using expected 
maximisation (EM) procedure. That would possibly result with better estimates of 
coefficients, but unfortunately, also with inflated standard errors, with no clear 
method of correction.
18 
Thus, unlike Christev and Fitzroy (2002), who were had more success with their 
survey data and successfully estimated the Arrelano-Bond model for their panel of 
similar dimensions, we simply fail with the dynamic specification and propose to rely 
on simpler panel methods, as do Grosfeld and Nivet (1999). 
                                                           
18 See classic discussion in Griliches (1986). Also a recent overview is offered by Allison (2002). 20 
Yet one lesson from the dynamic specifications (columns (5) and (6)) are  important: 
even if dynamic models are deficient, they indicate that coefficients of sectoral wages 
are not robust for this change in specification. More than one reason for this is 
possible. One simple correction we may try, is to assume that the significance of 
sectoral wages in columns (1)-(4) is forced by the choice specification, namely, as the 
variable may capture time effects, which were not directly accounted for so far. 
Following this idea, we adjust for time effects. Results are presented in columns (1)-
(3) in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5. Wage equations with time effects. Dependent variable: ∆l_rwage 
 (1) 
1998-2001 
Random 
Effects 
GLS 
(2) 
1998-2001 
Fixed 
Effects 
(within) 
(3) 
1998-01 
Pooled 
OLS
a 
(4) 
1998-2001 
Random 
Effects 
GLS 
(5) 
1998-2001 
Fixed 
Effects 
(within) 
(6) 
1998-2001 
Pooled 
OLS
a 
Constant 0.071 
(0.052) 
0.050 
(0.063) 
0.074 
(.087) 
0.072 0.056  0.073 
(0.087) 
∆quasi_rent -  -  -  0.187*** 
(0.041) 
0.227*** 
(0.189) 
0.176*** 
(0.042) 
∆l_rtremp  0.188*** 
(0.041) 
0.235*** 
0.054 
0.174*** 
(0.043) 
- -  - 
∆ l_rswage  -0.141 
(0.444) 
0.599 
(0.591) 
-0.308 
(0.287) 
- -  - 
∆l_unsu_nt-1 
b  -0.187 
(0.152) 
-0.194 
(0.190) 
-0.193 
(0.109) 
-0.187 
(0.151) 
-0.165 
(0.189) 
-0.193† 
(0.220) 
Wald χ
2  116.33***     116.64***     
F    19.66*** 99.60***    24.01*** 122.54*** 
R
2  0.154 0.147   0.154  0.153 0.154 
Hausman 
test 
    χ
2(4)=1.67  
N
  587 587 587  587  587 587 
*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; **** Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1 
a Robust standard errors; corrected for possible interdependence of observations within the 
same provinces (clusters) 
b Survey unemployment rates are mid year values (see Table 4); therefore one year lag is used 
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Indeed, coefficients on sectoral wages become insignificant and highly unstable, as 
they no longer capture time effects. Similarly, the regional unemployment variable  – 
is insignificant for columns 1-5, and is only 10% significant for column 6 (i.e. when 
using the pooled OLS technique), yet – unlike sectoral wages – both the signs and 
magnitude of effects remain similar to earlier specifications.  More positively, the 
coefficients on revenue per employee remain practically unchanged and highly 
significant – again, we have consistent evidence, which can be interpreted as evidence 
of rent sharing. 
Inconsistent results on sectoral wages in the adjusted specification and negative signs 
of the coefficients suggest that the variable may be better used differently. Namely, as 
argued above, the ratio of revenue per employee over sectoral wage, may be a good 
proxy for quasi rents. The latter indicates the opportunity cost outside the company 
and the former is an indicator of ability to pay. If correct, the argument could explain 
the negative sign of the real sectoral wage coefficient: lower sectoral wages would 
mean higher relative rents. Correspondingly, we construct a new variable, which in 
logarithmic form is simply given as: quasi_rent = l_rtremp – l_rswage. The results 
are reported in columns (4)-(6) of Table 5. The new indicator performs as expected. 
Coefficients are highly significant and similar to those estimated for revenue per head. 
Also, results on unemployment are not affected.  
Finally, we compare the different estimation methods. Applying the Hausman test to 
random versus fixed effects models, i.e. to equations (4) and (5) in Table 5, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that coefficients are the same, as the test statistic is highly 
insignificant (χ
2(4)=1.67). On the basis of this test we recommend the random effects 
model. A similar result was obtained by Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), where the 
Hausman test produces the same effect. Despited the short time dimension of the 
model, the potential problems resulting from individual effects were clearly alleviated 
by first differencing of  variables. 
 
At this junction, we wish to explore further the characteristics of rent sharing, 
focusing on two issues: /1/ asymmetry, and /2/ dissimilarity in behaviour of different 
ownership categories of firms. 22 
We start with asymmetry. In Table 6 below we allow for difference in quasi-rent 
elasticity of wages, by introducing a supplementary variable. This new variable - 
∆quasi_rent_in - takes a value of zero for all observations where ∆quasi rent<0, and 
has a value equal to ∆quasi rent where ∆quasi rent>0. By doing this, we introduce a 
diiferential coefficient for those observations, where change was positive. As before, 
we apply both the fixed and random effects model, and find the latter preferable, as 
differences in coefficients appear insignificant based on Hausman test.  
 
Table 6. Asymmetry. Dependent variable: ∆l_rwage
a 
 (1) 
1998-2001; Random 
Effects GLS 
(2) 
1998-2001; Fixed 
Effects (within) 
Constant  0.091 (0.053)†  0.067 (0.065) 
∆quasi_rent  0.273 (0.062)***  0.284 (0.083)*** 
∆quasi_rent_in  -0.188 (0.102)†  -0.131 (0.146) 
∆ l_unsu_nt-1 
b  -0.189 (0.151)  -0.162 (0.189) 
Wald χ
2  120.35***  
F   19.35*** 
R
2 0.160  0.158 
Hausman test      χ
2(5) = 1.79 
N
  587 587 
*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; **** Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1 
a Time effects included 
b Survey unemployment rates are mid year values (see Table 4); therefore one year lag is used 23 
 
The results reveal that indeed, the elasticity of wages differs, when the increase in 
quasi rent is separated from the decrease. For firms with decreasing quasi rents, the 
elasticity of wages is 0.273, for those with increasing it falls  to 0.085=0.273-0.188. 
This is a positive finding, as it indicates that wage pressure may be less of a problem 
than indicated by aggregate results. Companies in which performance is improving 
are capable of increasing retained earnings and finance further development, as 
elasticity of wages is relatively low and therefore cost dynamics are kept under 
control. On the other hand, wage pressure seems to be responsive to deterioration in 
performance, which may indicate that it is not only wages but also employment, 
which ranks high in employees’ utility function. Interestingly, in this respect the 
results differ from those obtained by Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) for the earlier 
transition period.
19 While their estimation of elasticity for firms with increasing quasi 
rents is very similar to ours (0.166), they obtain a very different result for those, 
where quasi rents are decreasing: for their sample it is very low (0.018) and 
insignificant. The change in behaviour may reflect growing concerns of the 
employees about their employment, given the deterioration in labour market 
conditions. This particular effect however is not well captured by regional cross-
section in labour market indicators – when we tested for different coefficients in 
elasticity of regional unemployment, we found virtually no difference between firms 
with increasing and decreasing quasi rents. 
 
Last but not least, we wish to explore, if wage behaviour differs across ownership 
sectors. We distinguish between four ownership categories: (i) companies entirely 
owned by the state treasury, (ii) companies with majority state shares, (iii) companies 
privatised until 2001, (iv) new private companies. All tests are presented in Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
19 Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) use revenue per employee. For reasons argued before, we prefer our new 
simple measure of quasi rents, but empirically it makes little difference. 24 
 
 
Table 7. Ownership. Dependent variable: ∆l_rwage
a 
 (1) 
1998-2001 
Random Effects 
GLS. 
All 
c 
(1a) 
Wald test 
for 
quasi_rent
: 
privatised 
v. other 
groups 
c 
(2) 
1998-2001 
Random 
Effects 
GLS.  
De novo 
firms 
(3) 
1998-2001 
Random 
Effects 
GLS. 
Privatised 
(4) 
1998-2001 
Random 
Effects 
GLS. 
 
State 
(Mixed) 
(5) 
1998-2001 
Random 
Effects 
GLS.  
 
State 
(100%) 
Constant 0.076  (0.051)    -0.115 
(0.171) 
-0.021 
(0.109) 
-0.025 
(0.123) 
0.224 
(0.061)**
* 
∆quasi_r
ent_dn 
0.341 
(0.102)*** 
χ
2(1)=11.0
3*** 
0.395 
(0.158)** 
    
∆quasi_r
ent_ps 
-0.063 (0.071)  -    -0.105 
(0.074) 
  
∆quasi_r
ent_mx 
0.239 (0.097)**  χ
2(1)=6.44
** 
  0.213 
(0.091)* 
 
∆quasi_r
ent_st 
0.283 
(0.058)*** 
χ
2(1)=15.2
7*** 
    0.230 
(0.047)**
* 
∆ 
l_unsu_n
t-1 
b 
-0.196 (0.145)    0.567 
(0.571) 
0.079 
(0.304) 
0.039 
(0.361) 
-0.668 
(0.169)**
* 
Wald χ
2 139.15***    16.55**  34.70***  17.72*** 115.16*** 
R
2 0.181    0.105 0.176 0.191  0.356 
N 587    127  168  80  212 
*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; **** Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1 
a Time effects included. 
b Survey unemployment rates are mid year values (see Table 4); therefore one year lag is used 
c All other Wald tests for differences in quasi-rent coefficients between ownership groups 
produced highly insignificant results 25 
 
First we restrict ourselves to a comparison of differences in quasi rent elasticity of 
wages. Again, we separate corresponding coefficients by replacing  ∆quasi_rent by 
four new variables, which take values of zero for three of the ownership categories 
and equal the value of  ∆quasi_rent for one selected category. Wald test for 
differences in coefficients reveal that elasticity in the privatised sector differs 
significantly from all other ownership sectors. Unlike the other, there is hardly any 
evidence of rent sharing in the privatised sector – coefficients are low and 
insignificant. Further inspection reveals that a fault line is not between companies, 
which are controlled by the state, and those where privatisation process started: 
difference between the companies entirely owned by the Treasury and those with 
some minority private ownership is highly insignificant and coefficients are far more 
similar than those between privatised and mixed state ownership. In contrast, the 
Wald test for the two latter groups is undoubtedly significant (see Table 7, column 
1a). Finally, there is strong indication of rent sharing in de novo sector. Yet, before 
paradoxically concluding that de novo sector is similar to the state sector, we wish to 
run separate estimations for all ownership sectors to explore if there are other 
differences beyond quasi rent elasticity of wages. The results are in columns (2)-(5) of 
Table 7. 26 
The exercise turns out to be productive, as several additional conclusions can be 
drawn, including comparison with Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), who use a similar 
design (however: (i) there is no de novo group in their sample, as it relates to the early 
transition period, (ii) our groupings within the state sector differ). Looking both at 
Wald statistics and R
2 it is easy to notice that wage behaviour of state companies is 
clearly most uniform and consistent. Interestingly, that confirms Grosfeld and Nivets’ 
(1999) findings for the early transition period. Furthermore, the state sector reveals 
two additional characteristics. First, similarly to Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), regional 
unemployment coefficient is highly significant, while it plays no role for the other 
ownership sectors. The unemployment elasticity of wages in the state sector is 
remarkably high, at –0.668. Second, the value of the intercept term is best estimated 
for the state sector, it is also much higher than for the other sectors. In this respect, 
comparison with de novo sector is particularly interesting. While quasi rent elasticity 
of wages in de novo sector is slightly higher than in the state sector, the former 
exhibits the strongest trend in wage growth, independent of ability to pay. Clearly, a 
different wage setting mechanism is operating.  
In the state sector, wage pressure seems to be strong, and is also highly responsive 
both to regional unemployment and to availability of quasi rents. In the new private 
companies, the basic trend in wage increases is insignificant but they respond stronger 
to quasi rents.  
However, the most dramatic result relates to privatised sector, where we can notice a 
dramatic difference in wage behaviour as compared with the state sector. There is 
hardly any evidence of rent sharing in the privatised sector. In this respect, we were 
able to confirm earlier results by Grosfeld and Nivet (1999).  The positive results of 
privatisation still exist, even ten years after the early stages of economic reforms. 
 27 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our motivation was to see if the difference between new and old firms in wage setting 
dominates the state – privatised cross section. The answer seems to be that both 
distinctions are important. When we estimate separate equations, a clear pattern in 
wages setting emerges.  
Wage dynamics in state firms are highly sensitive to regional unemployment, while 
this finding disappears in the private sector. On the other hand, in both state firms and 
new private firms, quasi rent elasticity of wages is substantial. That contrasts with the 
behaviour of privatised companies, where the rent sharing pattern is broken. What 
increases our confidence in this last effect is the fact that similar results were reported 
by Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) for the earlier transition period. 
Two more general lessons are worth reporting. First, we hope that our proposed new 
simple measure of quasi rent may be effectively applied in the future, as it produces 
consistent results. Second, the sharp contrast in employment elasticity between 
ownership sectors indicates that wage curve parameters may be evolving over time in 
countries, which undergo ownership transformations. In particular, we may expect the 
unemployment elasticity of wages to decrease as a result of privatisation process. 
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